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United States courts and legal commentators have long wrestled
with problems of judicial jurisdiction in disputes between parties from
different states of the Union. Far less attention has been devoted to
questions of jurisdiction in international controversies. This inatten-
tion has produced considerable confusion among lower courts, re-
sulting in a variety of inconsistent approaches to jurisdiction over
foreign defendants. This confusion disserves the goals of fairness,
sound judicial administration, and friendly international relations.
The most frequent response of United States courts to jurisdictional
challenges by' foreigners has been to apply Due Process standards
developed in domestic cases. Parts I and II of this Article describe
this and other approaches taken by United States courts in inter-
national cases. Parts III and IV of the Article argue that the domestic
Due Process approach taken by most United States courts overlooks
important differences between assertions of jurisdiction in the inter-
state context and those in the international context. These differences,
the Article contends, require a modification of domestic Due Process
limitations on personal jurisdiction in cases involving foreign defend-
ants. The Article concludes by outlining an appropriate Due Process
standard for assertions of personal jurisdiction by United States courts
in international cases.
I. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN DOMESTIC CASES
Existing constitutional limitations on assertions of personal juris-
diction can be briefly summarized.' Ironically, constitutional limi-
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I Commentary concerning the constitutional limitations on judicial jurisdiction of
United States courts is extensive. E.g., Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elim-
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tations on the judicial jurisdiction of United States courts can be
traced to 19th century perceptions about public international law. In
Pennoyer v. Neff,2 the Supreme Court relied on two related principles
of international law in articulating constitutional limits on state court
judicial jurisdiction: (1) "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory;" 3 and
(2) "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons and property without its territory. ' 4 The Court reasoned that
these principles of international law were equally applicable to the
several states of the Union, and that they significantly limited the
judicial jurisdiction of state courts. Under Pennoyer's territorial the-
ory of sovereignty, a state court could exercise personal jurisdiction
over any defendant who was served with process within the territory
of the state. According to Pennoyer, however, the Constitution pro-
hibited a state from exercising personal jurisdiction over persons
located outside the state's territory, regardless of that person's con-
nection to the state.'
This century's dramatic expansion of interstate commerce increas-
ingly strained Pennoyer's territorial limitations on state court juris-
diction.6 In 1945, after some equivocation, the Court abandoned its
strict territorial view of judicial jurisdiction. In International Shoe
ination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1 (1982) [here-
inafter Abrams]; Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.
CT. REv. 241; Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569 (1958); Redish, Due
Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw.
U.L. REv. 112 (1981) [hereinafter Redish]; Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident
Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DUQ. L.
REv. 221 (1967-68) [hereinafter Seidelson]; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966) [hereinafter
von Mehren & Trautman]; Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal
Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REv. 485 (1984) [hereinafter
Weintraub].
2 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Id. at 722.
Id. Like many 19th century Supreme Court decisions involving international law
questions, Pennoyer relied on treatises by Joseph Story and Henry Wheaton as
authority for its formulation of the limitations on state judicial jurisdiction. See J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AD DoMESTIc (8th ed.
1883); H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1866).
1 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727 ("Process from the tribunals of one state cannot run
into another state").
6 See M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, H. SMITH & H. KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 273-75 (3d ed. 1976).
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Co. v. Washington,7 the Court fashioned the now-classic rule that
the fourteenth amendment allowed a state court to exercise jurisdiction
over persons located outside the state's territory, but only if the
defendant had "minimum contacts" with the forum state "such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."'" The minimum contacts test pre-
served Pennoyer's territorial foundation, but relaxed the territoriality
principle to allow suits against out-of-state persons with sufficiently
close connections to the forum state.
Deciding when particular contacts are sufficiently close to support
state court jurisdiction under International Shoe has proved an elusive
task. The Court's most recent thorough treatment of the subject came
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 9 In World-Wide Volk-
swagen, the Court characterized the minimum contacts test as re-
quiring that "the defendant's conduct and connections with the forum
state [be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there."' 0 In addition to focusing on foreseeability, the Court
concluded that other issues play a role in Due Process analysis.
According to World- Wide Volkswagen, the burden on a defendant
of litigating in a foreign forum is the "primary concern" in any Due
Process analysis;" this burden will often, but not always, be closely
related to the defendant's ability to have foreseen litigation in the
forum. The Court also enumerated a nonexclusive list of other factors
that must be considered in "appropriate" cases:
the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when
that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to
choose the forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Other im-
portant judicial jurisdiction decisions include Kulko v. California Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denkla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). More
recently, the Court considered issues of personal jurisdiction in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985); Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770 (1984); Ins. Co. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456"
U.S. 694 (1982).
,0 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 290.
1 Id. at 297.
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the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest
of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.
12
Application of the minimum contacts test in the domestic context
has provoked substantial criticism. The standard requires fact-inten-
sive examination of individual patterns of conduct and contacts. This
case-by-case analysis inevitably produces a degree of uncertainty re-
sulting from dissimilar views of when it is "reasonable," or consistent
with "fair play and substantial justice," to require a defendant to
appear in the forum's courts. 3 In addition, some commentators have
argued that the minimum contacts test reflects archaic notions of
territorial sovereignty derived from international law that do not
properly apply in the interstate context.' 4 Critics also argue that the
existing Due Process standard unduly elevates the interests of defend-
ants over those of plaintiffs. These commentators suggest confining
Due Process analysis solely to the balance of convenience and hard-
ships between the parties. 5
Despite these criticisms, International Shoe's minimum contacts test
generally appears to function adequately in interstate cases. First, by
focusing on the defendant's purposeful or foreseeable contacts with
the forum, the test provides a measure of certainty and predictability.16
12 Id. (citations omitted). More recently, the Supreme Court has distinguished
between "specific jurisdiction" and "general jurisdiction." Hall, 466 U.S. at 408.
The terms were first coined by Professors von Mehren and Trautman. See von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1136-37. Specific jurisdiction involves ad-
judication of a controversy that relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum.
Hall, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1144-45.
General jurisdiction involves a court's adjudication of a claim that does not arise
out of the defendant's conduct within the forum. The exercise of general jurisdiction
ordinarily requires that the defendant have "continuous and systematic general
business contacts" with the forum. Hall, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9; von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 1, at 1136-37. It is not yet clear what role these notions of
specific and general jurisdiction will play in the Court's Due Process analysis.
,1 Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907
(1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("The disarray among federal
and state courts . . . may well have a disruptive effect on commercial relations in
which certainty of result is a prime objective").
"4 Redish, supra note 1, at 115-32; Weintraub, supra note 1, at 503-05.
1 Packel, Congressional Power to Reduce Personal Jurisdiction Litigation, 59
TEMP. L.Q. 919 (1986); Redish, supra note 1, at 1104; Seidelson, supra note 1;
Weintraub, supra note 1.
16 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297. In the Court's words the
minimum contacts test gives "a degree of predictability to the legal system that
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
[Vol. 17:1
JURISDICTION IN INT'L CASES
Second, by ensuring that the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, has
some relation to the forum state, the minimum contacts test seeks
to reduce the risk that a party will unwillingly have its legal rights
determined by a tribunal with which it has no relation. Third, the
test plays an important role in equalizing significant litigation ad-
vantages enjoyed by many plaintiffs. 7 Finally, by allowing for con-
sideration of the relative litigation burdens a particular forum places
on the parties, the minimum contacts test seeks to avoid seriously
inconveniencing either party. For these reasons, the Court has shown
little inclination to follow suggestions that it radically revise its Due
Process analysis of judicial jurisdiction questions. The remainder of
this Article assumes the minimum contacts test will remain the con-
stitutional test for personal jurisdiction in domestic cases and considers
whether the same standard should apply in international cases.
II. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN
INTERNATIONAL CASES
The post-War era's expansion of international trade fueled a dra-
matic increase in legal disputes between United States citizens and
foreign persons. In many cases United States litigants choose to prefer
United States courts, rather than foreign courts, to resolve their
disputes. Conversely, most foreign litigants are anxious to avoid
United States courts. 8 As a result, international cases in United States
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."
Id. See also von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared
and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REv. 279, 313 (1983).
,1 "The defendant's jurisdictional preference rests on the advantages that a plaintiff
typically enjoys in selecting among several forums and on the proposition that, other
things being equal, burdens that must rest on either the challenger or the challenged
are to be borne by him who seeks to change the status quo." von Mehren, supra
note 16, at 321-22. Plaintiffs have much greater ability to select a forum than
defendants, which serves to protect a plaintiff's interests. Cf. World- Wide Volkswagen
Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
Other commentators invoke "the old rule in dubrio prop reo: the fault of the
defendant has still to be proved," as a justification for the defendant's preferred
status. De Winter, Excessive Jurisdiction in Private International Law, 17 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 706, 717 (1968); Cf. von Mehren, supra note 16, at 307.
18 This is not always the case. Foreign litigants may sometimes wish to take
advantage of liberal United States discovery opportunities, more favorable substantive
laws, or a perceived tendency of United States courts to make larger damage awards
than their foreign counterparts. See, e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (English plaintiff brings suit in United
States court against English and other European defendants). Conversely, United
1987]
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courts frequently involve jurisdictional challenges by foreign defend-
ants. As in domestic cases, these challenges typically are grounded,
at least in part, on the Due Process Clause.
The Supreme Court has been unable to provide significant guidance
to lower courts for resolving Due Process challenges by foreigners.
Only two Supreme Court decisions, Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lumbia, S.A. v. Hall,19 and Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining
Co.,20 have involved Due Process challenges to a state court's juris-
diction over a foreign person. In neither case did the defendant
question the applicability of the International Shoe minimum contacts
test to foreigners. Thus, both cases routinely applied the minimum
contacts test developed in domestic cases, without addressing whether
the standard was appropriate in the international context.
Not surprisingly, lower courts uniformly have not read Helicopteros
or Perkins as deciding what Due Process standard applies to assertions
of personal jurisdiction over foreigners. 2' Lacking express guidance
from the Supreme Court, lower courts have responded to jurisdictional
challenges by foreign defendants in a variety of ways. As described
below, these various approaches treat foreign persons in very different
ways and involve markedly different jurisdictional claims over foreign
persons .22
A. Judicial Jurisdiction in State Law Cases
State and lower federal courts have frequently considered Due
Process challenges to assertions of long-arm jurisdiction over for-
eigners. 21 Most courts have applied the same standards to resolve
States litigants sometimes perceive advantages in foreign forums. E.g., In re Union
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp.
842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (United States defendant seeks dismissal of foreign plaintiff's
suit in United States court on grounds of forum non conveniens). For a discussion
of the Bhopal case, see Note, International Mass Tort Litigation: Forum Non
Conveniens and the Adequate Alternative Forum in Light of the Bhopal Disaster;
16 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 109 (1986).
19 Hall, 466 U.S. at 408.
2 Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
21 See cases cited in notes 26-30 infra.
22 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and heard oral argument in a
case involving Due Process limitations on the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendants. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 39
Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W.
2103 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1986). See also infra note 157.
23 Due Process challenges arise in both state and federal courts. Most challenges
in state courts occur in state law actions and are grounded on the fourteenth
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personal jurisdiction challenges by foreigners as they apply to chal-
lenges by United States nationals. As the American Law Institute's
(ALI) Revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law describes: "the
criteria for exercise of judicial jurisdiction are basically the same for
claims arising out of international transactions or involving a non-
resident alien as a party," as the criteria for domestic cases.24 Some
courts have explicitly taken the Revised Restatement's position, usu-
ally reasoning that "there are no equitable or practical reasons for
treating alien manufacturers in products liability actions differently
than domestic corporations. ' 25 Other courts have simply applied do-
mestic Due Process formulae to international cases without expressly
considering whether a different approach is appropriate for claims
against foreign defendants. 26
A number of lower courts have rejected this majority approach
and have applied different personal jurisdiction standards to foreign
defendants. Some courts have required foreign defendants to have
amendment. Due Process challenges in federal courts occur both in diversity cases
involving state law claims and in federal question cases. It is generally accepted that
a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is obliged by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(e) to apply state jurisdictional statutes to determine the extent of its
own personal jurisdiction. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.
1963); 2 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.22[1], at 4-193 and 4.32[2] (2d
ed. 1981). In addition, federal courts sitting in diversity actions will apply the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment, Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 231-33,
presumably on the grounds that it, like state statutory law, is incorporated by Rule
4. The response of federal courts to jurisdictional challenges in federal question
cases is discussed below. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
24 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421
note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 6, Apr. 12, 1985) (emphasis added). Id. at comment f.
23 Note, Civil Procedure - Long Arm Statutes - Jurisdiction Over Alien Man-
ufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1585, 1588 (1972) (citing
authorities). See also Velandra v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292
(6th Cir. 1964); Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292, 298 (D.D.C. 1964); von
Mehren and Trautman, supra note 1, at 1136.
26 Thos. P. Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980);
Davis H. Elliott Co. v. Carribbean Util. Co., 513 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1975);
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975); Elefteriou
v. Tanker Archontissa, 443 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1971); Sousa v. Ocean Sunflower
Shipping Co., 608 F. Supp. 1309 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Stu-
diengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 392 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Del. 1975); Marshall Exports,
Inc. v. C.A. Phillips, 385 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D.N.C. 1974). A few courts have applied
domestic Due Process standards in international cases, but have further reasoned
that particular cases could implicate foreign sovereign interests demanding special
treatment. Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th
Cir. 1981); Copiers, Typewriters, Calculators Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp.
312, 321 (D. Md. 1983).
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closer contacts with the forum state than would be necessary for
jurisdiction over a United States defendant. 27 "[W]hen we are dealing
with a manufacturer in a foreign country, we should consider ad-
ditional factors" that may require foregoing jurisdiction. 21
Other courts have expressly required less close contacts with the
forum state from foreign defendants than from domestic persons. 29
Some courts have reached this result without acknowledging that a
different standard exists for non-United States defendants:30 "the
courts have been willing to interpret the jurisdictional requirement
generously where alien defendants are involved."'" In one case a
French crane manufacturer sold one of its products to an unrelated
French company, which in turn sold the crane to an unrelated United
States distributor. The crane eventually found its way to Pennsylvania
where it malfunctioned. Personal jurisdiction over the French man-
ufacturer was upheld in a subsequent tort suit, notwithstanding the
manufacturer's lack of knowledge as to the crane's destination, its
lack of any other connection to the forum, and the fact that the
crane was apparently the only product manufactured by the defendant
27 Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.
1980), quoting Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1341 (2d Cir. 1972); Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 487 P.2d
234, 241 (1971). See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD 113 (2d ed. 1981) ("more substantial activity within the United
States should be required to bring a foreign national into an American court than
to bring a citizen of one of the United States into the court of a sister state").
28 Omstead, 5 Wash. App. at 270, 487 P.2d at 241.
29 See Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969);
Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973).
See also Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 931-32, 939, 945 (1985) [hereinafter Weinberg].
30 Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1984);
Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983); Poyner v. Erma Werke
Gmbh, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980); Hetrick v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 429 F.
Supp. 116 (D. Neb. 1976); Reilly v. P.J. Wolff & Sohne, 374 F. Supp. 775 (D.N.J.
1974); Gorso v. Bell Equip. Corp., 330 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Benn v.
Linden Crane Co., 326 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Charles Gendler & Co. v.
Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 508 A.2d 1127 (1986); Le Manufacture Francaise
Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1980); Ross v.
Spiegel, Inc., 43 Ohio App. 2d 297, 373 N.E.2d 1288 (1977) ("The forum state has
an interest in opening its courts to Ohio residents seeking redress from nonresidents
who have set in motion activities which ultimately result in an injury in Ohio");
Bryant v. Finnish National Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d
625 (1965).
11 Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85,
126 (1983) [hereinafter Lilly].
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ever to have been purchased in the United States.3 2 The court con-
cluded that the safety of local residents justified exercising jurisdiction
over "these French corporations which placed an allegedly dangerous
and defective product into the channels of commerce." 33
B. Judicial Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases
The treatment of judicial jurisdiction by lower courts in federal
question cases also is marked by confusion. Federal courts have taken
two markedly different approaches to personal jurisdiction in federal
question cases. Under the majority approach, federal courts examine
the defendant's contacts with the state of the Union in which the
court sits:34 "[T]he overwhelming consensus among federal courts is
to analyze questions of in personam jurisdiction over alien defendants
by examining the relationship of the defendant, the litigation and the
forum under traditional International Shoe principles." 35
Other courts have taken a different approach in federal question
cases, applying what is sometimes referred to as an "aggregate con-
tacts" or "national contacts" test.3 6 Courts adopted the national
contacts test in reaction to "the 'anomaly' of using state guidelines
to restrict federal jurisdiction, and the practical difficulties the practice
has created." 3 7 To meet these objections, some federal courts have
32 Gorso, 330 F. Supp. at 834. The French corporations had given Bell exclusive
rights to distribute their cranes in the United States and Puerto Rico, but no other
relationships existed between the companies, and Bell "distributed" only one crane
in the United States. Id.
11 Id. at 836.
34 See De James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276, 1279 (D.N.J.
1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981) (requiring sufficient contacts with New
Jersey when applying New Jersey's long-arm statute); Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhr-
kohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (citing authorities); Note, Alien Cor-
porations and Aggregate Contracts: A Genuinely Federal Standard, 95 HARv. L.
REv. 470, 478 (1981) [hereinafter Alien Corporations].
31 Superior Coal Co., 83 F.R.D. at 419.
36 See, e.g., Paulson Inv. Co. v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 615 (D. Ore.
1984); Coats Co. v. Vulcan Equip. Co., 459 F. Supp. 654, 659-60 (N.D. Ill. 1978);
Eng'g Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cen-
tronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H.
1977); Cyromedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 290-92 (D. Conn.
1975); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 356-58 (W.D. Mich. 1973);
Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,594; Alco
Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972). National contacts tests
also have been applied in purely domestic cases involving jurisdiction of federal
courts under certain federal statutes. See infra note 160.
17 Alien Corporations, supra note 34, at 474. See also Note, National Contacts
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looked to the foreign defendants' contacts with the United States as
a whole, rather than to contacts with particular states.38 As one court
explained:
where, as here, suit is brought against alien defendants, the court
properly may consider the aggregate presence of the defendant's
apparatus in the United States as a whole. Due process or traditional
notions of fair play should not immunize an alien defendant from
suit in the United States simply because each state makes up only
a fraction of the substantial market for the offending product.3 9
As noted earlier, however, most federal courts have refused to
adopt a national contacts test. These decisions often have approved
a national contacts test as a constitutional standard in federal question
cases, but have reasoned that neither federal rules nor congressional
legislation authorize federal courts to apply a national contacts test. 40
Courts have been more willing to adopt a national contacts test in
cases involving federal statutes that authorize nationwide service of
locess. These statutes frequently have been interpreted as authorizing
use of a national contacts test, which has uniformly been held con-
sistent with the Due Process Clause. 41
as a Basis For In Personam Jurisdiction Over Aliens In Federal Question Suits, 70
CALnF. L. REV. 686 (1982); Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations In
Antitrust Actions: Towards A More Uniform Approach, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 330
(1980).
38 For a discussion of the consistency of a national contacts test with the objectives
of the Due Process Clause, see infra notes 149-72 and accompanying text. Cf.
Brunette Mach. Works v. Kockum Ind., 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
19 Engineered Sports Prods., 362 F. Supp. at 728.
See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589-F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Wells Fargo
& Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977); Honeywell,
Inc., 509 F.2d at 1143 n.2; De James, 491 F. Supp. at 1282-83; AG - Tronic, Inc.,
v. Frank Pavilour, Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393, 400-01 (D. Neb. 1976); Edward J. Moriarity
& Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 389-90 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
As noted earlier, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) is interpreted as requiring
federal courts to apply state long-arm statutes and jurisdictional standards. See supra
note 23. There is no general federal personal jurisdiction statute, and most specific
federal statutes are silent on the question of personal jurisdiction. For a list of
federal statutes that do address issues of personal jurisdiction, see 2 J. MooRE, J.
LucAs, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.33 (2d ed. 1986).
41 E.g., Leasco Data Processing v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); Paulson Inv. Co., 603 F. Supp. at 615 (Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Eng'g Equip. Co., 446 F. Supp. at 706 (admiralty); Garmer v. Enright,
71 F.R.D. 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Alcoa Standard
Corp., 345 F. Supp. at 14 (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Note, Personal
Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations in Antitrust Actions: Toward a More Uniform
Approach, 54 ST. JO-N'S L. REV. 330 (1980) (Clayton Act). Other federal statutes
expressly call for application of a national contacts test to foreign entities. Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982).
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C. Need for a Single Constitutional Standard for Judicial
Jurisdiction in International Cases
Whatever the merits of any one of the various approaches to judicial
jurisdiction in international cases, the proliferation of different Due
Process standards is plainly undesirable. Uniform treatment of federal
constitutional questions is important in all fields, but it is particularly
important where other nations' interests and United States foreign
relations are implicated. 42 Moreover, there is a special need for uni-
form treatment of jurisdictional issues. Foreigners often will come
from legal, cultural, and economic environments that differ signifi-
cantly from their United States counterparts. As a result, clear,
uniform jurisdictional rules in United States courts are necessary to
prevent surprise and permit effective business planning. 43 For all these
reasons, the adage that the nation "must speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments" 44 is par-
ticularly applicable in the jurisdictional context. Under existing law,
however, the United States speaks with many inconsistent voices about
the reach of United States judicial jurisdiction in international cases.
This disparity of treatment, and the uncertainty it creates, is unsat-
isfactory and should be remedied.
III. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN FOREIGN COURTS AND UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Judicial Jurisdiction in Foreign Courts
Limitations in foreign states on assertions of judicial jurisdiction
in international cases vary considerably. In general, there is some
recognition that assertions of jurisdiction should be tied to an affil-
iating relationship between the defendant and the forum state. Never-
theless, particular jurisdictional devices in a number of foreign states
depart from this ideal.
42 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-25 (1964); Jessup,
The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM.
J. INT'L L. 740 (1939).
41 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
- Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976). See also Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436, 440 (1968); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63-64
(1941) ("The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of
the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibilities for the
conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties").
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Not surprisingly, English rules of judicial jurisdiction are broadly
similar to United States principles.4 5 English courts, like their United
States counterparts, assert personal jurisdiction over defendants served
with process within England.4 Corporations and other legal entities
are deemed present if they "carry on business" within the jurisdic-
tion.47
English courts also have the power, similar to that granted by long-
arm statutes in the United States, to order service of process on
persons located outside English territory.48 In contractual disputes
English courts exercise broad personal jurisdiction over foreigners.
English law permits service outside England on parties to contracts:
(i) if the parties entered into the contract in England;49 (ii) if a party
breaches a contract through conduct in England;50 or (iii) if the
contract is governed by English law.5 In the field of torts, English
law permits service outside of England when the tort is "committed
within the jurisdiction. 5 2 Early English decisions held that the neg-
ligent manufacture of a product in a foreign state, and the subsequent
shipment of that product to England, did not constitute a tort com-
41 As discussed below, significant modifications of English rules of judicial juris-
diction will occur when the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 comes into
force. The Act implements the European Communities' 1968 Convention on the
Jurisdiction of Courts and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, as amended, 21 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 304) 77 (1978),
reprinted in 18 INT'L LEG. MAT. 8, 21 (1979) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. See
COLLINS, THE CIvIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS ACT 1982 (1983) and infra notes
71-73 and accompanying text.
Maharanee of Baroda v. Wilderstein [1972] 2 All E.R. 689; Colt Indus. v.
Sarlie [1966] 1 All E.R. 673. The rationale of these decisions permits jurisdiction
even if a defendant's presence within the forum is only "fleeting."
47 Okura & Co. v. Forsbacka Jernverks Aktiebolag [19141 1 K.B. 715 (C.A.);
Saccharin Corp. v. Chemische Fabrik von Heyden, A.G. [1911] 2 K.B. 516.
4s R.S.C. (Eng.), 0.11, r.l. Unlike service under United States long-arm statutes,
in England, process may not be served outside the jurisdiction without the prior
approval of the court. In deciding whether to grant leave to serve outside the
jurisdiction, English courts enjoy broad discretion to withhold approval because of
potential inconvenience to the defendant or because of doubts about the merits of
the plaintiff's case. Cordova Land Co. v. Victor Bros. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 793; Gibbon
v. Commerz and Creditbank, A.G. [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 113; George Monro, Ltd.
v. Am. Cyanamid and Chem. Corp. [1944] K.B. 432; The Hagen [1908] P. 189
(C.A.).
49 R.S.C., (Eng.), 0.11, r. l(d)(i).
- R.S.C., (Eng.), 0.11, r. l(e).
11 R.S.C., (Eng.), 0.11, r. l(d)(iii).
52 R.S.C., (Eng.), 0.11, r. 1(h).
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mitted within the jurisdiction.53 In contrast, subsequent decisions have
held that actively marketing a defective foreign-manufactured product
within England, without adequate warnings to English consumers,
constitutes a tort committed within the jurisdiction.5 4 It is unclear
whether active marketing or other purposeful conduct within England
is necessary for jurisdiction under these more recent decisions. When
pending legislation dealing with jurisdictional issues comes into force
in England, however, judicial jurisdiction will extend to foreign
defendants in any tort claim in which "the damage was sustained,
or resulted from any act committed" in England."
Judicial jurisdiction principles in civil law jurisdictions have fewer
similarities to United States rules.16 Judicial jurisdiction in many civil
law nations, including Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux Coun-
tries, starts with the principle that the defendant may be sued in his
domicile.5 7 While definitions of domicile vary, they typically refer to
the state where an individual habitually resides, or the state where
a company or other legal person has its "seat" or center of man-
agement."
Moreover, judicial jurisdiction in civil law countries typically ex-
tends to persons who commit torts within the jurisdiction. 9 National
53 George Monro, Ltd., [1944] K.B. at 432. Draper v. Trist and Trisbestos Brake
Linings, Ltd., [1939] 56 R.P.C. 429; The Hagen, [1908] P. 189; Societe Generale
de Paris v. Dreyfus Bro., [18851 29 Ch.D. 239.
14 Castree v. Squibb, Ltd., [19801 1 W.L.R. 1248 (C.A.).
51 R.S.C. (Eng.), amend, (No. 2) 1983; S.I. 1983 No. 1181 (L. 21). This amendment
presumably will extend English judicial jurisdiction to foreign defendants who have
not engaged in any sort of purposeful conduct within England. See Bier BV v.
Mines de Totasse d'Alsace, [1976] E.C.R. 1735 (E.C.J.).
36 G. DELAUME, II TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS § 8.01, at 1 (1986) ("There are
fundamental differences between civil and common law countries in matters regarding
international adjudicatory jurisdiction"); de Vries & Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Per-
sonal Actions - A Comparison on Civil Law Views, 44 IOWA L. REv. 306, 306-
07, 344 (1959) [hereinafter de Vries & Lowenfeld]. The summary of judicial juris-
diction in civil law states that follows in the text draws on these two sources, as
well as on Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory
Authority: An Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 335 (1972);
von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 167 Rec. des
Cours 13, 62-65 (1981); and Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Common
Law Countries, 10 AM. J. CoMp. L. 323 (1961).
17 G. DELAUME, II TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS § 8.12 (1986); de Vries & Lowenfeld,
supra note 56, at 306-07. See ZWILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] art. 16 (W. Ger.); U.
DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (2d ed. 1972); CODE
DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C. PR. crv.] arts. 42, 43 (Fr.); CODICE DI PROCEDURA CVILE
[C.P.c.] art. 4(1) (Italy).
18 G. DELAUME, II TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS § 8.12 (1986).
'9 C. PR. cIv. art. 46; ZPO art. 32.
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laws differ, however, on whether a defendant has committed a tort
within the jurisdiction if the plaintiff merely sustained injury within
the jurisdiction. 60 Similarly, most civil law states claim jurisdiction
over parties to contracts concluded or performed within the juris-
diction. 61
In addition to these comparatively unexceptional jurisdictional bases,
several civil law nations permit more expansive and controversial
assertions of judicial jurisdiction. Articles 14 and 15 of the French
Civil Code grant French courts jurisdiction over virtually any case
in which the plaintiff or defendant is a French citizen; 62 no other
relationship is required to vest a French court with jurisdiction if
one of the parties is a French citizen. Similarly, the courts of Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands exercise jurisdiction over almost all
cases involving nationals or residents. 63
Reliance on a party's nationality is not the only way civil law
nations make broad claims of judicial jurisdiction. German courts,
for example, exercise judicial jurisdiction over non-German domici-
liaries or residents that own property in Germany. 64 This jurisdictional
base does not depend on the value or nature of the property and
permits issuance of in personam judgments in any amount, even
exceeding the value of the defendant's property in Germany. 65 Under
this rule, "a Russian may leave his galoshes in a hotel in Berlin and
6o Id.
61 ZPO art. 29; C. PR. crv. art. 46; JUDICIAL CODE art. 635(3) (Belg.); C.P.c.
arts. 4(2), 20.
62 Article 14 of the French Civil Code provides: "An alien, even not residing in
France, may be summoned before the French courts for the fulfillment of obligations
contracted by him in France toward a French person; he may be brought before
the French courts for obligations contracted by him in a foreign country toward
French persons." C. PR. civ. art. 14.
Article 15 of the French Civil Code provides: "A French citizen may be brought
before a French court in respect of obligations contracted by him in a foreign
country, even towards an alien." C. PR. crv. art. 15. Articles 14 and 15 have been
broadly construed by the French courts to reach virtually all "obligations," including
those based on contract, quasi-contract, tort, and domestic relations. Cass. May 27,
1979, Weiss v. Soc. Atlantic Electric, REVUE CRrrmQu DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PRIVE [R.C.D.I.P] 113 (1971); Cass, Oct. 9, 1968, Gagnepain v. Bourgier, R.C.D.I.P.
316 (1969).
63 LUXEMBOURG CwVnL CODE art. 14; DUTCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 126(3).
64 ZPO art. 23; U. DROBNIG, AmERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
322-23 (2d ed. 1972); von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters
Under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16 INT'L LAW. 671 (1982).
63 Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND
CONFLICTS LAW 321, 328-29 (1961).
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may be sued in Berlin for a debt of 100,000 Marks because of presence
of assets within the jurisdiction." Danish, Swiss, and Swedish courts
apply similar jurisdictional rules. 67
Finally, several civil law countries have enacted "retaliatory" ju-
risdictional provisions. These provisions empower national courts to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign persons in circumstances where the
courts of the foreigner's home state would have asserted jurisdiction.
For example, Belgian domiciliaries can bring actions in Belgian courts
against foreign defendants if they can demonstrate that the courts
of the foreigner's domicile would entertain a comparable action against
a Belgian defendant. 68 Likewise, Italian courts will exercise jurisdiction
over actions by Italian nationals against foreigners, provided that the
foreigner's courts would entertain claims against Italians in like cir-
cumstances. 69 Austria and Portugal also have comparable retaliatory
statutes .70
The judicial jurisdiction of many civil law members of the European
Communities has been significantly affected by the Brussels Con-
vention on the Jurisdiction of Courts and the Recognition and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 7' The
Convention sets out permissible bases of personal jurisdiction and,
in addition, obliges member states to refrain from utilizing "exor-
bitant" jurisdictional devices against persons domiciled in other states
belonging to the Convention. 72 The Convention's jurisdictional lim-
- Id. at 329, paraphrasing Breit, Ueber das Auslaenderforum, 40 JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 636, 639 (1911). See RG Apr. 7, 1902, 51 RGZ 163; RG Jan. 19,
1911, 75 RGZ 147, 152; RG June 20, 1982, RGZ 322.
67 LAW ON CrVI. PROCEDURE, art. 248 (Den.); Swiss Debt Collection Statute,
SCHKG, SSBGV § 271. R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN
§ 4.21.6 (1965).
68 JUDICIAL CODE arts. 636, 638 (Belg.); G. DELAUME, II TRANSNATIONAL CON-
TRACTS § 8.08 (1986).
69 C.P.c. art. 4(4). G. DELAUME, II TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS § 8.09 (1986).
70 See Nadelmann, supra note 65, at 330-31.
7' Brussels Convention, supra note 45. See Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes
to the Common Market, 24 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 44 (1975); Herzog, The Common
Market Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments: An Interim
Update, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 417 (1977) [hereinafter Herzog]; Kohler, Practical
Experience of the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention in the Six Original
Contracting States, 34 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 563 (1985).
72 Brussels Convention, supra note 45, at art. 3. Article 3 specifically enumerates
several improper jurisdictional bases, including those set forth in the following
national codes: arts. 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code (giving French courts
jurisdiction over any case involving a French national); § 23 of the German Code
of Civil Procedure (giving German courts jurisdiction over any person owning any
property in Germany); and art. 638 of the Belgian Code of Civil Procedure (giving
Belgian courts jurisdiction over suits by domiciliaries against non-domiciliaries).
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itations are inapplicable to persons domiciled in countries not party
to the Convention, and non-domiciliaries continue to be subject solely
to the national laws of Convention parties, including those containing
exorbitant jurisdictional claims. 73
The Convention also requires its members to recognize and enforce
judgments rendered by the courts of other parties to the Convention. 74
To the chagrin of nations outside the European Communities, this
obligation extends to judgments against non-EC-domicilaries, even if
such judgments were based on exorbitant jurisdictional devices. Thus,
German courts would be obliged to recognize and enforce a French
judgment rendered against a United States citizen, even where the
French judgment was based solely on an assertion of exorbitant
jurisdiction under articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code. Com-
mentators and government representatives from outside the European
Communities have vigorously criticized this result. 75
B. Judicial Jurisdiction Under International Law
During the 19th century international law was widely understood
to limit assertions of judicial jurisdiction by national courts. As the
discussion of international law in Pennoyer v. Neff illustrates, these
limitations were stringent, sometimes purporting to restrict judicial
jurisdiction to claims against persons or property located within na-
tional territory. 76 In the frequently quoted words of Joseph Story:
73 Brussels Convention, supra note 45, at arts. 3 & 4. Herzog, supra note 71, at
423.
74 Brussels Convention, supra note 45, at arts. 5-30. The Convention contains
narrow exceptions to the recognition and enforcement obligation which are based
on public policy. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the Convention's recognition
and enforcement requirements are at least as demanding as those of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
11 Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judg-
ments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001 (1967) ("chal-
lenge[s] the friendly relations between nations built on respect for due process of
law"); Pryles & Trindade, The Common Market (E.E. C.) Convention on Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters - Possible Impact
Upon Australian Citizens, 48 Aus. L.J. 185 (1974); Smit, The Proposed United
States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments:
A Prototype for the Future?, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443, 468 (1977) ("this discrimination
is indefensible on any ground"); von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments, 167 Rec. des Cours 13, 101 (1981) ("single most regressive step
that has occurred in international recognition and enforcement practice in this
century").
76 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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Considered in an international point of view, jurisdiction, to be
rightfully exercised, must be founded either upon the person being
within the territory or upon the thing being within the territory; for
otherwise there can be no sovereignty exerted. . . . no sovereignty
can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits to subject
either persons or property to its judicial decisions. 71
Numerous 19th century commentators endorsed Story's view that
international law imposed restrictions on assertions of judicial juris-
diction.78 Even more significantly, judicial decisions, especially in the
United States and England, repeatedly embraced Story's view of
international law, either in limiting their own jurisdiction, or in
refusing to give effect to foreign judgments.79 Likewise, a number
of 19th century diplomatic protests were grounded on the notion that
77 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 539 (7th ed. 1872).
71 E.g., F. SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 355, 369-71 (W. Guthrie
trans. 2d ed. 1880); E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 144-45 (C. Fenwick trans.
1758); G. VON MARTENS, LAW OF NATIONS 102-04, 105-06 (T. Bradford trans. 1795);
F. WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 646, 649, 715 (3d ed. 1905); H. WHEATON,
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 77, 111-14, 134-51 (1866). Story drew heavily
from the work of the Dutch international law scholar Ulrich Huber and other
continental sources. Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts
Law: A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230 (1961); Yntema, The Historical Bases
of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. CoMy. L. 297 (1953) [hereinafter Yntema].
Huber's best-known work, De Conflictu Legum, articulated strict territorial views
of both legislative and judicial jurisdiction. Lorenzen, Huber's de conflictu legum,
13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 390-91 (1919); Yntema, supra, at 306-07.
79 Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote, [1894] A.C. 670 ("a decree pronounced
in absentem by a foreign court, to the jurisdiction of which the defendant has not
in any way submitted himself, is by international law an absolute nullity"); Schibsby
v. Westenholz (1870), 6 Q.B. 155; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174
(1850) ("the well-established rules of international law regulating governments foreign
to each other" restrict the exercise of judicial jurisdiction); Piquet v. Swan, 5 Mason
35 (1828) (Story, J.); De Witt v. Burnett, 3 Barb. 96 (N.Y. 1848); Wood v. Watkinson,
17 Conn. 500 (1846); Whittier v. Wendell, 7 N.H. 257 (1834); Hall v. Williams, 10
Me. 278, 287 (1833); Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447, 453 (1831 N.Y.); Bissell
v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 468 (1813); Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. 194, 197 (1811
N.Y.). It is clear from these decisions that many 19th century United States and
English courts understood international law as imposing binding limitations upon
the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by municipal courts. It is true that "international
comity" or "private international law" was sometimes invoked as the justification
for these rules, see Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 145, 174-77 (1972-73) [hereinafter Akehurst], and that in some contexts the man-
datory character of comity or private international law was different from that of
public international law. Id. at 212-14, 226-27. In the specific field of judicial
jurisdiction, however, 19th century courts in the United States and England clearly
saw international law as imposing binding limitations on the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction.
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international law limited assertions of judicial jurisdiction by foreign
courts 80
For nMuch of this century, however, international law has devoted
comparatively little attention to questions of judicial jurisdiction."1
As a general rule, "the jurisdiction of courts in private controversies
was not an important concern of public international law, even when
its exercise had transnational implications." 82 More recently, this
perspective has been questioned. Many authorities argue that today
nations treat "assertions of jurisdiction that [are] considered extrav-
agant as violations of international law." 8 3 The emergence of limi-
tations derived from international law on exercises of judicial
jurisdiction is best reflected in the ALI's Revised Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law: "A state may, through its courts or admin-
istrative tribunals, exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to
a person or thing, if the relationship of the person or thing to the
10 Jacob Idler v. Venezuela (1885), reprinted in J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL AR-
BITRATIONS 3491, 3511-12 (1898) (citing with approval United States and English
decisions recognizing international law limits on judicial jurisdiction); Case of Lund
v. Ogden, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 75, 76-77 (1853) (holding that exercise of judicial
jurisdiction over United States resident by Texas would be "in violation of inter-
national comity, and a usurpation of general sovereignty, in derogation of the rights
of co-equal States"); Letter Concerning the Schooner Daylight from Secretary of
State Frelinghuyser to Mr. Morgan, dated May 17, 1884, reprinted in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 358 (1884) (quoting "uniform declaration of writers
on public law" that "in an, international point of view, either the thing or the
person made the subject of jurisdiction must be within the territory, for no sovereignty
can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits"); Letters from Secretary of
State Fish to General Schenck, dated Nov. 8, 1873 and Mar. 12, 1875, reprinted in
FoREIGN RELATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES 490 (1874) and id. at 592, 633 (1875)
(protesting that exercise of judicial jurisdiction by British courts over civil disputes
arising on high seas between sailors on United States vessels violates "rules of comity
between nations and the principles of international law"). It was, of course, widely
thought during the 19th century that international law limited both judicial and
legislative jurisdiction in criminal cases, as well as legislative jurisdiction in civil
cases. Akehurst, supra note 79, at 152-69. J. Moore, Review of Principles, Legis-
lations, Authorities, and Precedents Relating to Jurisdiction Over Offenses Com-
mitted by Foreigners Abroad, reprinted in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
770 (1887).
81 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW part IV, chap. 2, Intro. Note
(Tent. Draft. No. 6, Apr. 12, 1985) ("Until recently, public international law dealt
with judicial jurisdiction only when exercised on government initiative"). See also
De Winter, Excessive Jurisdiction in Private International Law, 17 INT'L & COME.
L.Q. 706, 706 (1968).
82 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW chap. 2, Intro. Note (Tent.
Draft No. 6, Apr. 12, 1985).
83 Id. See also infra note 86.
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state is such as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable. "4
The proposition that international law presently imposes a "rea-
sonableness" requirement on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction is
arguably somewhat overstated. No universal international agreement
purports to limit assertions of personal jurisdiction by national courts.
Likewise, assertions of exorbitant jurisdiction by national courts un-
dercut suggestions that state practice clearly reflects a rule prohibiting
such claims.85 Nonetheless, the Revised Restatement's "reasonable-
ness" test probably reflects an emerging consensus on international
law in this field. State representatives, as well as commentators, have
increasingly protested the exorbitant jurisdictional claims of other
nations, and have sometimes articulated notions of jurisdictional
restraint similar to the ALI's "reasonableness" rule.16 National courts
cite international law in refusing to recognize or enforce foreign
judgments based on exorbitant jurisdictional claims.8 7 Moreover, the
84 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
Apr. 12, 1985) (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 24 (1971).
83 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
86 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.10 (1935); De Winter, Excessive Jurisdiction
in Private International Law, 17 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 706, 712-13 (1968); Nadelmann,
Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in K. NADELMANN, A. VON MEHREN, & J. HAZARD,
XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 321 (1961); Stevenson, The
Relationship of Private International Law to Public International Law, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 561, 579-80 (1952) [hereinafter Stevenson]; Smit, Common and Civil Law
Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An Analysis of Underlying Policies,
21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 335, 344 (1972). In the words of one noted European
commentator: "From the viewpoint of international law, is there any justification
for all these rules of exceptional jurisdiction? The answer must be in the negative,
considering that these provisions, arbitrarily based on either the nationality or the
domicile of the plaintiff, lack valid legal foundation." Weser, Bases of Judicial
Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, 10 AM. J. COMp. L. 323, 328 (1961).
Foreign government protests over assertions of judicial jurisdiction are especially
likely when courts would apply public-policy based statutes like the antitrust laws.
See In re Westinghouse Uranium Contracts Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.
1980); Midland Bank plc. v. Laker Airways, slip op. (C.A. July 30, 1985) (Eng.);
British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. [1953] 1 Ch. 19. Protests
also occur in more ordinary commercial disputes. See infra note 87.
87 Report of the European Advisory Committee Under the Chairmanship of Lord
McNair on the Draft Restatement Relating to Jurisdiction, reprinted in International
Law Association, Report of the Fifty-First Conference (Tokyo) 537, 542 (1965);
Note from United States Department of State to Embassy of Greece, dated June
18, 1973, reprinted in Department of State, Digest of United States Practice in
International Law 197-98 (1973); G. HACKWORTH, II DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
172-73 (1941) (United States protest that Panama's exercise of judicial jurisdiction
over Canal Zone residents violates United States sovereignty). See Stevenson, supra
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European Communities' members have entered into an international
agreement restricting assertions of judicial jurisdiction over domici-
liaries of other member states.8" Other countries have made efforts,
sometimes successful, to draft international agreements codifying in-
ternational jurisdictional principles.89 These developments testify to
an emerging principle of international law requiring assertions of
judicial jurisdiction to be reasonable.
IV. FASHIONING A STANDARD OF JUDICIAL JURISDICTION FOR
INTERNATIONAL CASES
As we saw in Part II, United States courts have failed to articulate
a consistent standard of judicial jurisdiction in international cases.
This Part addresses this failure and proposes a Due Process standard
for application by United States courts in international cases.
The most frequent response of United States courts to jurisdictional
challenges in international cases has been to apply Due Process stand-
ards developed in domestic casesY° The following section considers
whether international cases possess special characteristics requiring
application of a different Due Process standard. The section concludes
that international assertions of jurisdiction do implicate special con-
cerns that call for modification of traditional Due Process standards.
The second section of this Part provides a sketch of an appropriate
Due Process standard for judicial jurisdiction in international cases.
note 86, at 579-80; von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United
States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401, 408-09 (1977). One English court has enjoined
prosecution of a United States lawsuit, partially on the grounds that the United
States court could not properly exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Midland
Bank plc v. Laker Airways, slip op. (C.A. July 30, 1985).
81 See supra notes 45, 71-75 and accompanying text.
89 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, (adopted Apr. 25, 1966, effective Feb. 1, 1971).
CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRJVE, ACTES ET DOCUMENTS
DE LA SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE (1966); Proposed U.S. - U.K. Convention on the
Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, reprinted
in 16 INT'L LEG. MAT. 71 (1977) (not ratified). In addition to the Brussels Convention,
several bilateral and multilateral treaties limit the permissible bases of judicial ju-
risdiction that may be relied on by states party to the treaties. E.g., Franco-Swiss
Convention on Jurisdiction and Execution of Judgments of June 15, 1809; Convention
Between the United States and the Swiss Confederation, art. VI, II Stat. 587, 591;
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air (Warsaw Convention), art. 28, 49 Stat. 3000, 3020 (1929).
90 See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
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A. Special Considerations in International Cases
Assertions of judicial jurisdiction in international cases raise a
number of concerns that are absent from purely domestic cases. This
section first discusses three differences between domestic and inter-
national cases that, upon analysis, do not provide a legitimate basis
for modifying traditional Due Process standards. The section then
discusses two other differences that do provide sound justifications
for treating judicial jurisdiction in international cases differently from
domestic cases.
1. Inappropriate Reasons for Treating International Cases
Differently From Domestic Cases
First, and most obviously, international cases involve defendants
who are not citizens or residents of the United States. Arguably,
United States constitutional limitations on the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction over nonresident aliens should be less restrictive than the
limits on jurisdiction over United States citizens or residents. This
result might seek support in the diminished constitutional protections
that nonresident aliens receive in various other contexts. For example,
several decisions have held that nonresident aliens seeking admittance
to the United States may not invoke the procedural protections of
the Due Process Clause.91 Similarly, other decisions have refused to
subject the substantive requirements imposed on immigration by non-
resident aliens to constitutional review. 92 Finally, reduced Due Process
protection also might seek support in notions that the Constitution
has no extraterritorial effect, at least for noncitizens. 93
Although reduced constitutional protection may be appropriate for
nonresident foreigners in some instances, it is plainly inappropriate
when determining limits on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. As
most courts have concluded, 94 the full protection of the Due Process
91 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651 (f892).
92 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); United
States ex rel. Knauf v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Bugajewitz v. Adams,
228 U.S. 585 (1913).
93 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 738. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 721 and comment b, § 722 (Tent. Draft No. 6, Apr. 12, 1985).
. 94 E.g., Wells Fargo & Co., 556 F.2d at 416 n.7; Velandra v. Regie Nationale
Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 294 n.7 (6th Cir. 1964). See also Russian Volunteer
Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489, 491-92 (1931) (aliens entitled to protection
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Clause should be available to foreign citizens summoned to defend
themselves in United States courts. It would be'unfair and ironic to
hale an alien into an unfamiliar United States court, forcing him to
litigate according to our procedures and laws, yet deny him the
protections of the Due Process Clause on the grounds that he is an
alien. 95
A second difference between international and domestic cases that
may bear on judicial jurisdiction involves the recognition and en-
forcement of United States judgments by foreign courts. In the do-
mestic context the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause generally
compels recognition of judgments issued in the courts of sister states.9
In the international context judgments rendered by United States
courts are given considerably less deference than provided by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. While practice varies between countries,
foreign courts often recognize United States judgments only in limited
circumstances.Y Most important, many foreign courts will refuse to
of fifth amendment); Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca de Navigazione, 248
U.S. 9 (1918) ("The respondent, although an alien enemy, is, of course, entitled to
defend before a judgment is entered"); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d
106, 111 (2d Cir. 1966).
91 Cases involving constitutional limits on assertions of jurisdiction requiring for-
eigners to appear in the United States are fundamentally different from those involving
refusals to admit foreigners seeking entry into the country. Foreigners who are
required to defend themselves in our courts are better analogized to resident aliens,
who do enjoy significant constitutional protections. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217 (1960); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). See also
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FoREIGN RELVIONs LAW § 722 (Tent. Draft No. 6, Apr.
12, 1985) ("An alien in the United -"!ates is entitled to the guarantees of the
Constitution of the United States, other than those expressly reserved for citizens")
(emphasis added). Indeed, resident aliens have sometimes been treated as a suspect
class for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs. v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (invalidating state exclusion of resident aliens
from practice as licensed civil engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(invalidating state exclusion of resident aliens from law practice); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (invalidating state statute barring resident aliens from
state civil service); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (invalidating state
statute denying welfare benefits to resident aliens).
96 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S.-(7 Cranch) 481
(1813). The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, does not compel
states to recognize or enforce judgments rendered by a court that lacked jurisdiction;
the clause does, however, compel states to give res judicata effect to the jurisdictional
determinations of sister-state's courts, provided that the defendant appeared in the
sister state's proceedings. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S.
522 (1931).
91 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Report and Proposed Resolution of Committee on
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recognize United States judgments based on assertions of jurisdiction
under long-arm statutes. 98
Some commentators have reasoned that the difficulties United States
plaintiffs face in enforcing United States judgments against foreign
defendants argues for more restrictive limits on judicial jurisdiction
in international cases. 99 The better view, however, is that foreign non-
recognition of United States judgments does not point decisively
towards any special Due Process treatment of judicial jurisdiction in
international cases. It is unclear how frequently foreign recognition
of judgments is necessary, even in international cases. Some foreign
defendants may voluntarily pay judgments rendered against them,
perhaps because they wish to continue or expand their United States
business activities. Other defendants may have assets in the United
States, may bring assets here in the future, or may have assets in
countries that will liberally enforce United States judgments, even if
rendered on the basis of long-arm jurisdiction. 100 For these reasons,
there is no way to predict accurately whether a particular plaintiff
will actually need to enforce a long-arm judgment rendered in a
United States court, and if so whether he will be successful. Without
these determinations, however, a rule restricting judicial jurisdiction
in international cases on the ground that resulting judgments may
be unenforceable, would have unjustifiable effects. Such a rule would
foreclose litigation in the United States by some plaintiffs who could
collect on judgments they obtained.' 0' In addition, the rule would
International Law (1972) ("non-recognition of United States' judgments abroad is
the rule rather than the exception"); Bertram-Nothnagel, Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards in West Germany, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 385 (1977);
Blom, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada, 57 OR. L. REv. 399,
409-17 (1978); Carl, Recognition of Texas Judgments in Courts of Foreign Nations
- And Vice Versa, 13 Hous. L. REv. 680, 686-87 (1976). See generally Council of
Europe, The Practical Guide to the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judicial
Decisions in Civil and Commercial Law (1975).
98 von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and
Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1601, 1610-29 (1968).
99 See, e.g., von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1126-27; Note, Obtaining
Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations - A Survey of U.S. Practice, 9
VAND. J. TRANS. L. 345, 372-73 (1976).
,00 This will become even more likely if the United States concludes enforcement
of judgments treaties with its trading partners. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANS-
NATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 77-78 (1986) and infra note 122.
101 A United States plaintiff's decision that he will not need to enforce a United
States judgment against a foreign defendant, or if so, that he will be successful in
doing so, would probably be fairly accurate in many cases. Both United States
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encourage foreign-states to limit recognition of United States judg-
ments, and penalize nationals of countries with liberal recognition
policies. Finally, if a particular assertion of United States long-arm
judicial jurisdiction over foreigners is regarded as fair and reasonable
by United States courts and legislatures, it would be anomalous to
forego such assertions solely because foreign states took a different
view.
A third way in which assertions of judicial jurisdiction in inter-
national cases differ from those in domestic cases involves the burden
of litigation. In general, litigation by a foreign defendant in inter-
national cases involves comparatively greater hardships than litigation
by a United States resident in another state or region of the United
States. In many international cases one party will be required to
follow procedural rules that differ markedly from those in its home
jurisdiction. 10 2 In addition, one litigant will generally be a significantly
plaintiffs and their counsel have substantial incentives to avoid wasting resources
obtaining unenforceable judgments against foreign defendants.
Courts are not limited to ad hoc approaches to the enforcement of judgments
problem. One might adopt a general rule requiring an especially close nexus between
foreign defendants and the forum on the theory that this would adjust the reach
of United States jurisdiction to reflect the uncertainty of foreign enforcement, thus
reducing unproductive litigation. This approach, however, would be unworkable.
First, foreign states' rules regarding non-enforcement of United States judgments
often do not turn solely on whether the judgment was based on an "exorbitant"
jurisdictional claim. Because many foreign states will refuse to enforce United States
judgments even where United States jurisdiction was plainly proper under interna-
tional law, restricting United States jurisdiction in international cases would have
only a marginal effect on the enforceability of United States judgments. Second,
the need for foreign enforcement of United States judgments against foreign defend-
ants will often turn on practical issues, e.g., future presence of assets in the United
States, unrelated to the closeness of the defendant's connections to the forum. Third,
foreign countries have very different rules regarding enforcement of United States
judgments. For these reasons, it would be difficult to devise a general rule of
jurisdiction over foreigners that would be well-tailored to deal with the non-en-
forcement of United States judgments by foreign states. If a number of foreign
states, however, only refused to recognize United States judgments when United
States courts had exceeded international law limitations on judicial jurisdiction, then
a general rule requiring jurisdiction over foreigners to be consistent with international
law would be a useful general response to the enforcement of judgments problem.
As we have seen, however, the problem is much broader than this.
102 The procedural differences between United States litigation and that in other
countries have been extensively documented. E.g., M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C.
OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 167-92 (1985); Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 823 (1985). The most important
differences involve broad discovery in the United States, greater reliance on the
adversary system, trial by jury, different approaches to fee shifting and contingent
fee arrangements, the relatively greater size of United States damage awards, and
different choice-of-law rules.
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greater distance from the forum than in purely domestic cases, and
time differences, language barriers, mail delays, transportation dif-
ficulties, and other logistical obstacles which impede efficient com-
munications will create further hardships. Furthermore, while the
United States is a relatively homogeneous legal, economic, cultural,
social and political unit, the domestic institutions and attitudes within
this country often differ markedly from those in foreign states. 103
Litigation in this unfamiliar environment often will create a host of
hardships not encountered in the domestic context. Finally, local
decision-makers may hold prejudices or parochial biases against for-
eign litigants not held against persons from other sections of the
nation.
In virtually all international cases, an increased litigation burden
will exist for the parties regardless of the forum. As a result, resolving
personal jurisdiction disputes usually will not involve avoiding liti-
gation burdens, but instead, deciding which party will bear the un-
avoidable inconvenience of litigating abroad. Moreover, as one court
observed, "many of the inconvenience burdens in [international cases]
are symmetrical."' 10 In general, both parties would suffer roughly
the same level of inconvenience if forced to litigate abroad.
The implications of the differences in litigation burdens in inter-
national cases are unclear. As we have seen, prevailing Due Process
doctrine teaches that the "primary concern" of the Due Process
Clause is the "burden on the defendant."' 15 The "plaintiff's interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief" is also a "relevant
factor,' l06 but current doctrine places greater weight on protecting
defendants from burdensome litigation than on ensuring plaintiffs a
convenient forum."0 7 In the words of one court of appeals, "the
law of personal jurisdiction . . . is asymmetrical. The primary concern
is for the burden on a defendant."108
,03 United States internal homogeneity, like that of other states, results in part
from the absence of domestic barriers to the free movement of persons, goods,
services, and information, A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 3-16 (1962); Hazard,
A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 241, 246-48, as
well as from our shared linguistic, cultural, religious and political heritages.
,04 Ins. Co. of North America, 649 F.2d at 1272.
10 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
106 Id.
,07 See supra note 17 for a review of the reasons for giving greater weight to the
defendant's inconvenience.
, Ins. Co. of North America, 649 F.2d at 1272.
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Under this view of the Due Process Clause, assertions of judicial
jurisdiction in international cases generally should be more restrained
than such assertions in purely domestic cases. Since litigation burdens
are greater in international cases, and since the burden on the defend-
ant is the primary concern of Due Process analysis, assertions of
United States jurisdiction will more frequently impose unacceptable
burdens on foreign defendants than on domestic defendants. 1°9 This
result does not appear to turn on a special constitutional standard
for judicial jurisdiction in international cases. Instead, more restrained
jurisdictional claims arguably would follow from the fact that liti-
gation burdens in international cases are, as a factual matter, usually
more significant than those in domestic cases, and from the signif-
icance that existing Due Process analysis places on burdens imposed
on defendants.
On the other hand, it is at least arguable that existing Due Process
formulations do not take adequate account of the greater hardships
that exist in the international context. Current Due Process analysis
generally permits jurisdiction when the defendant's contacts with the
forum are "such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there."" 0 Because of its focus on foreseeability and pre-
litigation contacts with the forum, this formulation may not give
adequate weight to the greater litigation burdens that exist in inter-
national cases. The better view, however, is that current Due Process
analysis is sufficiently flexible to take account of the comparatively
greater litigation burdens on private parties in international cases.
The Supreme Court's World-Wide Volkswagen decision, as well as
better-reasoned lower court decisions, appear to take the defendant's
litigation burdens into account in deciding foreseeability questions."'
Likewise, the lack of suggestions for a special Due Process standard
109 Some lower courts, however, appear to adopt a more symmetrical approach
to litigation burdens in Due Process cases. E.g., Neiman v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
Ltd., 619 F.2d 1189, 1195 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980). These courts typically compare the
respective litigation burdens that the plaintiff and defendant would bear in different
potential forums. Jurisdiction is likely to be found if the plaintiff's inconveniences
in litigating in a different forum exceed the defendant's inconvenience in litigating
in the plaintiff's chosen forum. Application of this Due Process standard in inter-
national cases would probably result in assertions of judicial jurisdiction much like
assertions of jurisdiction in purely domestic cases.
110 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297.
"I Id. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Prelitigation contacts with the
forum and foreseeability may often accurately reflect the inconvenience that litigating
in the forum will cause the defendant.
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for domestic cases involving great litigation inconvenience suggests
that existing Due Process formulations are able to deal with varying
levels of litigation burdens. In short, although current Due Process
analysis suggests that jurisdiction in international cases should be
more restrained than in domestic cases because of the increased
litigation burdens faced by foreign defendants, existing formulations
appear able to produce the requisite degree of restraint.
12
2. Reasons for Treating International Cases Differently From
Domestic Cases
There are, however, legitimate reasons for taking different ap-
proaches to the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in domestic and in-'
ternational cases. Treating jurisdiction differently in domestic and
international cases would be entirely consistent with existing United
States constitutional and common law doctrine in a number of other
H2 There may be situations in which a defendant would suffer significantly less
inconvenience litigating in the plaintiff's forum than the plaintiff would in the
defendant's forum. It is appropriate to take some account of such differences in
litigation burdens. "A jurisdiction analysis resting on the principle of relative party
ability to bear litigational burdens considers the ability not of the parties actually
involved in the litigation but of the class of plaintiffs or defendants to which the
parties belong." von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared
and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REV. 279, 313 (1983). This focus on the parties' class is
required by "considerations of administrability, planning and predictability." Id.
For example, litigation between consumers and some multistate business enterprises
may involve asymmetrical litigation burdens. This has led some commentators and
courts to suggest permitting more expansive jurisdiction in cases brought by localized
consumers against multistate defendants. Id. at 313-22; Copiers, Typewriters, Cal-
culators, Inc., 576 F. Supp. at 320-21. This principle should generally apply only
when the defendant's multistate activities actually affect the litigation burdens the
defendant would bear when litigating in the plaintiff's forum. This usually would
be the case only where the defendant's multistate activities include contacts with the
forum state. In this class of cases, however, existing Due Process analysis would
presumably permit jurisdiction in many situations.
In addition, there may be situations in which the increased burdens that a plaintiff
would encounter in foreign litigation have the effect of denying him any remedy.
As the Supreme Court hinted in Hall, 466 U.S. at 408 n.13, the absence of any
alternative forum would argue strongly for permitting assertion of United States
jurisdiction on the basis of less substantial contacts than would ordinarily be the
case. Before accepting claims of this sort, which may have intuitive appeal to United
States readers, cf. Weinberg, supra note 29, at 932-34 (speculating about inadequacy
of foreign forums), plaintiffs should be obliged to make a clear showing that suit
in a foreign forum would in fact provide no meaningful relief. See Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (only "if the remedy provided by the
alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at
all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight" in forum non
conveniens analysis).
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areas." 3 As Judge Jessup observed in the International Court of
Justice's Barcelona Traction decision, jurisdictional rules that are
"valid enough for interstate conflicts within the constitutional system
of the United States, may be improper when placing a burden on
international commerce."" 4
The first reason for different treatment of judicial jurisdiction in
international cases is that assertions of jurisdiction over foreigners
can affect United States foreign relations in ways that domestic claims
of jurisdiction cannot."5 The exercise of judicial jurisdiction over
foreign defendants by United States courts plainly implicates the
sovereign interests of foreign states. In the words of one English
court, "service out of the jurisdiction at the instance of our courts
is necessarily primafacie an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction
of the sovereignty of the foreign country where service is to be
effected.""16 As a result, assertions of United States judicial juris-
diction over foreigners can readily arouse foreign resentment." 7 This
risk is heightened because, although United States principles of judicial
jurisdiction are generally consistent with international law,"' they are
,,3 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255-56. (foreign plaintiff's choice of
forum entitled to less deference in forum non conveniens analysis than domestic
plaintiff's choice); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (interstate
choice of law principles require modification in international context); Scoles, In-
terstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1599 (1966) (interstate choice of law principles require modification
in international context); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 98, at 1607 ("We
cannot automatically derive solutions for international practice from decisions re-
specting recognition of judgments of sister-states"). See also infra note 123.
"1 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 164
(1970) (separate opinion of Jessup, J.). See also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens
J., concurring) (judicial jurisdiction of United States courts in the international
context may be different from that in the domestic context).
"I It is entirely appropriate for courts to take foreign relations concerns into
account when considering application of the Due Process Clause to assertions of
judicial jurisdiction. The act of state doctrine, which also reflects a constitutional
limitation on the jurisdiction of United States courts, is based in part on foreign
relations concerns. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398. Moreover, the Due Process Clause
has long been interpreted as reflecting federalism concerns, World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., 444 U.S. at 286, at least in part. Ins. Co. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie
de Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982). See also infra note 123.
116 George Monro, Ltd., [1944] 1 K.B. at 437 (emphasis added).
,,7 Indeed, United States claims of judicial jurisdiction have provoked foreign
resentment on a number of occasions in the past. See supra notes 86-87.
"I8 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421 Reporter's Note 2
(Tent. Draft No. 6, Apr. 12, 1985). See also Brussels Convention, supra note 45
(enumerating acceptable bases of jurisdiction for use among EC states).
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not always so. 119 Moreover, the imprecision of the international law
requirement that assertions of judicial jurisdiction be "reasonable"
creates further possibilities for dispute.
Because exorbitant assertions of judicial jurisdiction by United
States courts may offend foreign sovereigns, these claims can provoke
diplomatic protests,120 trigger commercial or judicial retaliation, 21 and
threaten friendly relations in unrelated fields. Equally important,
exorbitant jurisdictional claims can frustrate diplomatic initiatives by
the United States, particularly in the private international law field.
Most significantly, these claims can interfere with United States efforts
to conclude international agreements providing for mutual recognition
and enforcement of judgments or restricting exorbitant jurisdictional
claims by foreign states.
22
An appropriate way to deal with the risk that assertions of judicial
jurisdiction by United States courts will interfere with the nation's
foreign relations is to subject these claims to heightened constitutional
scrutiny. As discussed in detail below, heightened scrutiny would
place a check on exorbitant jurisdictional claims, thereby reducing
the risks of offending foreign sovereigns and interfering with United
States foreign relations. This approach to judicial jurisdiction finds
strong support in constitutional and common law principles in other
,19 Not all United States bases of personal jurisdiction are consistent with inter-
national law. See infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text discussing "tag" juris-
diction.
120 See supra notes 80, 86 and 87.
121 See infra notes 137-39.
122 Indeed, exorbitant claims of personal jurisdiction by United States courts already
helped quash one important diplomatic initiative. During the 1970's, the United
States initiated negotiations on a proposed U.S.-U.K. Convention on the Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, reprinted in 16 INT'L
LEG. MAT. 71 (1977). See North, The Draft U.K./U.S. Judgments Convention: A
British Viewpoint, 1 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219 (1979); Smit, The Proposed
United States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition of Judgments: A Pro-
totype for the Future?, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443 (1977). The Convention would have
provided for more liberal recognition and enforcement of United States and United
Kingdom judgments in the two countries' courts. Even more important, the Con-
vention would have restricted British courts' enforcement of foreign judgments against
United States companies based on exorbitant jurisdictional claims. This would have
reduced the potentially serious adverse consequences for United States companies
of the Brussels Convention, see supra note 75 and accompanying text, which was
a principal objective of the United States negotiators. Unfortunately, the United
Kingdom broke off consideration of the Convention after British industry protested
allegedly exorbitant jurisdictional claims by United States courts and argued that
the Convention would require recognition of these claims by British courts. North,
supra, at 233-38 (discussing United Kingdom opposition to the proposed Convention).
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international contexts, where heightened scrutiny is used to minimize
the risk that United States courts will infringe foreign sovereign
interests or interfere with national foreign relations. 23
Heightened scrutiny of state court jurisdictional claims also is called
for by the Constitution's stringent limitations on the role of individual
states in foreign affairs. Put simply, the Constitution prohibits any
"intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and to Congress."' 24 "[I]n
respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As
to such purposes the State . . . does not exist."' 25 When state courts
assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals residing abroad, the possi-
bility of state interference with the nation's foreign affairs arises;
when state courts make, or are perceived abroad to make, 26 exorbitant
jurisdictional assertions, the possibility of interference becomes a very
real risk. Heightened constitutional scrutiny of jurisdiction over for-
eigners would reduce the likelihood of exorbitant state court juris-
dictional claims, and thus, the risk of state interference in national
foreign affairs.
In addition to foreign relations considerations, heightened Due
Process scrutiny in international cases also is required by the character
3 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346
(1985) (enforcing agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims arising from international
contract, while assuming unenforceability of same agreement in domestic context);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (enforcing agreement to arbitrate
securities law claims arising from international contract, despite unenforceability in
domestic context); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398 (act of state doctrine bars inquiry
into certain foreign public acts); Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354 (1959) (using choice of law and comity principles to moderate application of
Jones Act to foreigners); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (using choice of
law and comity principles to moderate application of Jones Act to foreign persons);
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1982) (providing
immunity for certain foreign government conduct); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 403 (Tent. Draft No. 6, Apr. 12, 1985) (legislative jurisdiction
subject to rule of reason). See also Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325,
1333 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring heightened scrutiny of assertions of judicial jurisdiction
in international cases); Ins. Co. of North America, 649 F.2d at 1272 (requiring heightened
scrutiny of assertions of judicial jurisdiction in international cases).
124 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 83 (1971) ("The power of a State of the United States to
exercise judicial jurisdiction in violation of international law may be limited by the
supremacy clause").
125 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
,26 "It is important in the relations of this country with other nations that any
possible appearance of injustice or tenable ground for resentment be avoided." ALI,
Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 108 (1969).
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of federal powers over foreign commerce.' 27 Because "[fjoreign com-
merce is preeminently a matter of national concern, ' ' 2 state legis-
lation affecting foreign commerce is generally subject to more searching
constitutional scrutiny than legislation affecting interstate com-
merce.1 29 In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, for example,
the Court struck down a local tax on containers used in foreign
commerce, reasoning that the levy "cannot withstand scrutiny under
. . . the additional tests that a tax on foreign commerce must
satisfy.'"130
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the need for heightened
constitutional scrutiny of state legislation affecting foreign commerce,
it has not articulated a precise standard for this scrutiny. It has,
however, focused attention on several specific aspects of state reg-
ulations affecting foreign commerce. By giving special attention to
these issues, the Court has sought to reduce the risks of disrupting
commercial relations or provoking foreign commercial retaliation,
both of which are present in the international, but not the domestic,
context. ''
127 "Congress shall have power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign nations."
U.S. CoN.sT. art. I, § 8.
128 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). Federal
powers to regulate foreign commerce are broader than the same powers over interstate
commerce. In Japan Line the Court observed: "Although the Constitution, art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate commerce 'with foreign Nations' and
'among the several states' in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders
intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater." Id. at 448
n.12 (emphasis added). See Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Con-
vention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432 (1941). The Court's
view of the foreign commerce power has not always been so unequivocal. Pittsburgh
& S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587 (1895); License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
590, 675 (1847).
,29 Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 185 (1983) ("Given that
[appellant's business] is international . . . we must subject this case to the additional
scrutiny required by the Foreign Commerce Clause"); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r
of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980); Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 446, 451 ("For
these reasons, we believe that an inquiry more elaborate than that mandated by
Complete Auto is necessary when a State seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign,
rather than of interstate, commerce"); Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 283-86
(1976).
,30 Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 451. Indeed, putting constitutional interpretation
aside, United States courts have frequently established special rules applicable to
international commercial activities and foreign commerce. See supra note 123.
31 The Commerce Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and related consti-
tutional provisions, generally forbid states of the Union from retaliating against one
another in commercial matters. "In the Commerce Clause, [the Framers] provided
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First, the Court has shown special concern over state legislation
that would be likely to provoke retaliatory commercial measures by
foreign states. 132 Second, the Court has given particular attention to
avoiding the unfairness to private parties that might result from
conflicting or overreaching regulation of foreign commerce by dif-
ferent nations.'33 Finally, the Court has used-heightened constitutional
scrutiny to ensure that state regulation of foreign commerce is con-
sistent with federal policy and international practice. 3 4 As we will
see, all of these concerns are present when United States courts assert
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.
Heightened constitutional scrutiny of assertions of judicial juris-
diction is necessary because these claims, even more than the im-
position of taxes in Japan Line, can impose significant burdens on
foreign commerce. As we already have seen, litigation burdens are
usually substantially greater in international cases than in domestic
cases.' 35 Similarly, foreigners often will be unfamiliar with the juris-
dictional devices used by United States courts, and thus surprised by
the need to defend in a United States forum. Because certainty and
predictability are especially important in international commercial
that the Nation was to be a common market, a 'free trade unit' in which the States
are debarred from acting as separable economic entities." World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., 444 U.S. at 293.
132 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194-96; Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 450-51,
453 n.18; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). See also Lauritzen, 345 U.S.
at 582 ("in dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the
necessity for mutual forebearance if retaliations are to be avoided"). Concern that
the state conduct may provoke foreign retaliation is motivated in part by fears that
the ability of the federal judiciary, or the federal political branches, to prevent
retaliatory conduct in international matters, is much more limited than on an interstate
level. The Court also has emphasized that foreign retaliatory measures typically
would be directed at the United States as a whole, rather than at particular states
of the Union. Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279 ("Upon whom would such a claim [by a
foreign state] be made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our Constitution,
she can hold no exterior relations with other nations. It would be made upon the
government of the United States"). This is not always the case. The United Kingdom
recently enacted retaliatory unitary taxation legislation that penalized private com-
panies with close connections to those states of the Union that employ unitary
taxation formulas. See Born, Recent British Responses to the Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of United States Law, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 91, 101-06 (1985).
131 Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 446-47; Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 447-48;
Cf. Societe Int'l v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (reversing trial court's sanctions
because noncompliance with discovery order was required by foreign law).
"I Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193-97; Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 451-54.
,31 See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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matters,36 this can have particularly severe consequences for foreign
commerce.
Heightened scrutiny of assertions of judicial jurisdiction by state
courts also is necessary because these claims are likely to provoke
retaliatory actions by foreign states. 37 "Conduct that is overly self-
regarding with respect to the taking and exercise of jurisdiction can
disturb the international order and produce political, legal, and eco-
nomic reprisals."' 38 Indeed, exorbitant jurisdictional claims by United
States courts automatically trigger foreign jurisdiction over United
States nationals by countries that have enacted retaliatory jurisdic-
tional statutes. 139
For these reasons, the general rule that "a more extensive consti-
tutional inquiry is required" in cases that involve "Congress' power
to 'regulate commerce with foreign nations," ' "' 0 is fully applicable
to assertions of judicial jurisdiction over foreign entities. Given the
focus of existing constitutional limitations on state interference with
foreign relations and commerce, heightened scrutiny is particularly
appropriate when state courts assert jurisdiction over foreigners.
36 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 105 S. Ct. at 3355; The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
131 The significant risk of retaliation in the field of jurisdiction is frequently
acknowledged. SZASZY, INTERNATIONAL CIvIL PROCEDURE 311 (1967); Nadelmann,
Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Com-
mon Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001, 1021 (1967) ("the proper answer
to power politics is retaliation"); Smit, The Proposed United States-United Kingdom
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Prototype for the
Future, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 443, 468 (1977); von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments, 167 Rec. des Cours 13, 100 (1981).
38 von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 1, at 1127.
,19 As discussed previously at supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text, a number
of foreign nations have enacted "retaliatory" jurisdictional provisions. These pro-
visions grant local courts personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants, including
United States citizens, in circumstances where the foreigner's home courts would
exercise jurisdiction over a local. Most states that have enacted retaliatory jurisdic-
tional provisions have not also enacted exorbitant jurisdictional statutes. See G.
DELAUME, II TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS § 8.08 (1986).
European and other states also might be moved to enact additional, more severe
retaliatory legislation if United States courts make repeated assertions of exorbitant
jurisdiction. Retaliatory legislation already has been enacted in the United Kingdom
to counter what is perceived as excessively broad claims of jurisdiction to tax by
individual states, see Born, supra note 132, at 91, and improper extraterritorial
applications of United States substantive laws. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Ju-
risdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L
L. 257 (1981).
140 Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 446.
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Nonetheless, equally rigorous scrutiny is generally called for when
federal courts assert jurisdiction over foreign entities. As we have
seen, many of the reasons for applying heightened scrutiny to state
jurisdictional claims are equally applicable to jurisdictional claims by
federal courts.141 Furthermore, heightened scrutiny would be consistent
with notions of restraint in related issues involving foreigners in
federal courts. 142
B. A Standard of Judicial Jurisdiction
1. The Level of Due Process Scrutiny in International Cases
The contours of heightened scrutiny of judicial jurisdiction in
international cases are dictated by the justifications for such scrutiny:
preventing friction with foreign sovereigns, avoiding foreign retal-
iation or interference with United States foreign relations, and min-
imizing unfairness to persons engaged in foreign commerce. To
accomplish these objectives, the Due Process Clause should impose
two related requirements on assertions of judicial jurisdiction in
international cases. First the Clause should require United States
courts to use particular caution in asserting long-arm jurisdiction over
foreigners; second, it should require closer connections between the
forum and the defendant than are necessary in domestic cases.
14 Foreign relations and foreign commerce interests are arguably matters of leg-
islative concern to Congress, but not of constitutional relevance in interpreting the
Due Process Clause. As noted earlier, this argument is rebutted by the significant
role that foreign relations and foreign commerce concerns have played in numerous
other fields of constitutional analysis. See supra notes 113, 115 and 123. Of course,
if Congress enacted a statute bearing on the degree of restraint United States federal
courts should use in asserting judicial jurisdiction over foreigners, then an analysis
of legislative intent would replace or supplement analysis calling for heightened
constitutional scrutiny. When the federal political branches exercise their authority
over foreign affairs and foreign commerce by granting jurisdiction, this judgment
obviates the need for concern about judicial interference with foreign relations or
commerce. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194 (1983). Typically, however, legislative
guidance has not addressed personal jurisdiction issues with sufficient specificity to
inform general Due Process analysis. The congressional enactment most relevant to
the Due Process limits on personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants is the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, providing for personal and subject-matter juris-
diction over foreign states and their instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1982).
The Act limits United States jurisdiction to cases arising from conduct with a tight
nexus to the United States, id. § 1605; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983). This limitation indirectly suggests that similar restraint
would be appropriate in other international cases.
142 See supra notes 115, 123 and accompanying text.
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'In the words of one English judge, "as a matter of international
comity it seems to me important to make sure that no . . . service
[outside the jurisdiction] shall be allowed unless it is clearly within
both the letter and spirit" of applicable English jurisdictional stat-
utes. 143 Or, as Justice Harlan explained, "[g]reat care and reserve
should be exercised when extending our notions of personal juris-
diction into the international field."' 144 As both comments suggest,
before asserting jurisdiction over foreign persons, United States courts
should give careful scrutiny to the defendant's relationship to the
forum, paying especial attention to jurisdictional claims likely to
offend foreign sovereigns.
One benefit of heightened constitutional scrutiny is that it would
reduce the risk of exorbitant United States jurisdictional claims caused
by misapplications of personal jurisdictional standards. Because the
consequences of exorbitant jurisdictional claims in international cases
are more serious than in domestic cases, it is appropriate to use
greater care to ensure that such claims are not made. By focusing
on offense to foreign sovereigns, the suggested analysis also would
seek to reduce the likelihood that United States jurisdictional asser-
tions would be inconsistent with emerging norms of international law
and thus objectionable to foreign states. For example, under the
suggested analysis, the Due Process Clause would likely preclude the
exercise of "tag" jurisdiction in international cases based on a for-
eigner's fleeting presence in the forum. Although jurisdiction based
on transitory presence within the forum is often permitted in domestic
cases, 145 it is inconsistent with emerging principles of international
law. Moreover, in most commentator's eyes, "tag" jurisdiction is
inconsistent with the premises underlying International Shoe's min-
imum contacts test. 46 Under the heightened scrutiny proposed above,
,41 George Monro, Ltd., [1944] 1 K.B. at 437 (Scott, J.).
" United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 403-04 (1965) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). See also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
,41 United States courts have generally rejected constitutional challenges to asser-
tions of jurisdiction based on transitory presence within the forum. Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959);
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1971).
146 Commentators are virtually unanimous in condemning "tag" jurisdiction as
inconsistent with International Shoe's principles of reasonableness and fairness. E.g.,
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); von Mehren, Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments, 167 Rec. des Cours 13, 43, 59 (1981).
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"tag" jurisdiction should not be available in international cases. 147
Due Process analysis in international cases also should require closer
prelitigation contacts between the defendant and the forum than would
be necessary in domestic cases. Specifying exactly how much closer
a foreign defendant's connections with the forum should be admittedly
is difficult, and perhaps unwise. As in the domestic context, "the
criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities
which justify the subjection of a [foreign] corporation to suit, and
those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative.' '1 48
Although precision is difficult and perhaps undesirable, however, the
appropriate Due Process standard in international cases should require
more substantial, direct, or foreseeable distribution of products into
the forum, or more pervasive and sustained business contacts with
the forum, than that required in domestic cases. As we already have
seen, this would reduce the risks of offending foreign sovereigns,
provoking retaliatory responses, interfering with United States foreign
affars, and imposing unfairness on foreign defendants.
2. The Focus of Due Process Analysis in International Cases
International cases not only require a different level of Due Process
scrutiny from that applicable in domestic cases, but also demand a
different focus of Due Process analysis. For purposes of international
law and foreign relations, the separate identities of individual states
of the Union are generally irrelevant. In the Supreme Court's words,
"[flor local interests, the several states of the Union exist, but for
national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we
are but one people, one nation, one power."'' 49
1 '"Tag' jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction based on service of process on a person
only transitorily in the territory of the state, is not generally acceptable under
international law." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421 comment
e (Tent. Draft No. 6, Apr. 12, 1985). Article 5 of the Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
see supra note 45, expressly excludes "tag" service as an acceptable basis for
jurisdiction.
141 Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319. See also Note, National Contacts As a Basis
for In Personam Jurisdiction Over Aliens In Federal Question Suits, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 686 (1982); Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations In Antitrust
Actions: Towards A More Uniform Approach, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 330 (1980).
"I Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). See also Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 100 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("the states
are unknown to foreign nations"); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 ("in respect of our
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State . .
. does not exist"). The Revised Restatement on Foreign Relations Law observes:
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Under this basic principle of international law, foreign nations may
properly complain when a United States court asserts jurisdiction
over a national who has no reasonable connection to the United
States. 150 A foreign nation, however, has no basis for complaint under
international law when a United States court asserts jurisdiction over
a national who has a reasonably close relationship to the United
States, even if the foreign national has no connections with the state
of the Union asserting jurisdiction.' "International law addresses
the reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate by a
[nation-state]; it does not concern itself with the allocation of juris-
diction among domestic courts, for example between national and
state courts in a federal system.' 1 52
The de minimis importance of individual states of the Union for
purposes of international law and foreign relations has important
implications for defining Due Process limitations on exercises of
judicial jurisdiction in international cases. It suggests inquiring into
a foreign defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole,
rather than into contacts with a particular state. A Due Process test
which looks to "national contacts" would be consistent with inter-
national law. As we have seen, international law is not concerned
with allocations of jurisdiction among national sub-units. Instead,
international law looks only to the propriety of a nation-state's as-
sertion of jurisdiction over foreigners. Indeed, a national contacts
test would be in closer keeping with the practice of other nations
than the current Due Process analysis employed by United States
courts."
Putting aside questions of international law, a Due Process standard
for jurisdiction which looked to national contacts would serve im-
portant public policy goals. First, a national contacts test would
"A state of the United States is not a 'state' under international law, since by its
constitutional status it does not have capacity to conduct foreign relations. The
United States alone, not any of its constituent states, enjoys international sovereignty
and nationhood." RESTATEMENT (REvISED) FoREIGN RELATIONs LAW § 1 Reporter's
Note (e) (Tent. Draft No. 6, Apr. 12, 1985).
110 This Article previously addressed the limits that international law places on
assertions of judicial jurisdiction over foreigners. See id. at § 421 and comment a;
supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
- Id. at § 421, comments h-j.
152 Id.
" See supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text. Cf. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S.
at 449 (emphasizing the "need for federal uniformity" in matters affecting foreign
commerce).
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permit United States courts to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest extent
permitted under international law. This would relieve United States
plaintiffs of the burden of litigating in foreign forums, without giving
foreign governments basis for offense.
Second, a national contacts test would provide a better method
for dealing with foreign defendants who have significant United States
contacts spread evenly, but thinly, over a number of individual states.154
Jurisdiction in some United States forum would clearly be desirable
in such cases, but current Due Process analysis would generally
preclude any individual state from asserting jurisdiction. A test look-
ing at least in part to national contacts would improve on current
law by facilitating suits by United States plaintiffs against foreign
defendants with significant, but widely dispersed contacts with this
country.
Third, considering a foreign defendant's national contacts and his
expectations about being required to litigate in United States courts
would provide a reasonably well-tailored measure of inconvenience
to foreign defendants. "[C]orporations . . . headquartered in foreign
lands will usually be no more inconvenienced by a trip to one state
[of the Union] than another."' 55 Similarly, there are relatively minor
differences among the several states of the Union in procedural rules,
154 See Centronics Data Computer Corp., 432 F. Supp. at 664 (national contacts
test necessary to prevent aliens from committing "serious torts or contract breaches
without ever having enough contacts with any one [United States] forum to give
those injured an opportunity to seek redress" in the United States); Engineered
Sports Prods., 362 F. Supp. at 728 ("due process or traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice should not immunize an alien defendant from suit in the
United States simply because each state makes up only a fraction of the substantial
nationwide market for the offending product").
Based on the reported decisions, it is apparently not uncommon for foreigners to
have significant contacts with the United States, but not with any particular state.
One common fact pattern involves the foreign defendants who have entered into
contracts with unrelated United States entities calling for distribution of the foreign
company's product in the United States, without any further reference to particular
states of the Union. See Gorso, 330 F. Supp. at 834; Le Manufacture Francaise,
620 P.2d at 1040; Ross, 373 N.E.2d at 1288. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. would
often preclude jurisdiction in such cases, because the defendant could not "reasonably
anticipate being haled into [the forum-state's] court." World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp., 444 U.S. at 297.
5 Centronics Data Computer Corp., 432 F. Supp. at 663; Charles Gendler &
Co., 508 A.2d at 1140 ("New York, which Nippon proffers as an alternative forum,
is no more convenient for Nippon, which is located in Tokyo"). This, of course,
is not always the case. For example, a Nova Scotia company that has significant
trade with Maine, but no other state in the Union, would likely have fairly strong
objections to being required to defend against a suit in Arizona or Texas.
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including discovery, legal ethics, including treatment of legal fees, or
in the quantum of damages likely to be recovered. In contrast, United
States rules and practices in these areas often differ dramatically from
rules and practices in other countries. 5 6 Finally, the United States
social, cultural, and political environment will be equally foreign to
non-citizens, regardless of the particular state the parties choose as
the forum.
For these reasons, requiring a foreign defendant to litigate in the
United States, rather than in another country, has major consequences
and can impose significant hardship. The risk of unfairly imposing
these hardships on foreigners can be minimized by requiring closer
contacts with the United States forum than would be necessary in
an interstate context. Once it is clear that litigation will be required
in some United States forum, however, it often will be relatively
unimportant which United States forum is selected. Unlike the existing
"state" contacts test, a test looking at least in part to national
contacts, would more accurately reflect this proposition. 5 7
The exact focus of a Due Process test based on national contacts
will vary in different types of cases. In federal question cases arising
in federal courts, a "pure" national contacts Due Process standard
that looks solely to the defendant's contacts with the United States
is appropriate.' This test would be consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the fifth amendment, as well as with principles developed
under the fourteenth amendment. 5 9 The federal government pos-
156 M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS
167-92, 457-505 (1985).
"I In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, supra note 22,
currently pending before the United States Supreme Court, Petitioner has argued
briefly that assertions of jurisdiction should be moderated in international cases
because of the danger of offending foreign sovereigns or violating international law.
Brief for Petitioner at 13-15, 26, Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985), cert. granted,
54 U.S.L.W. 2103 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1986). Neither Respondent nor Petitioner, nor the
lower courts, addresses the question whether a national contacts test would be
appropriate in international cases.
"I See Note, National Contacts As a Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction Over
Aliens In Federal Question Suits, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 686 (1982); Alien Corporations,
supra note 34, at 470 (citing federal decisions adopting a national contacts test);
Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations In Antitrust Actions: Towards
a More Uniform Approach, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 330 (1980).
59 Lilly, supra note 31, at 129 ("the principle that a federal court can constitu-
tionally aggregate contacts seems relatively straightforward"); Alien Corporations,
supra note 34, at 481-82 ("the aggregation of national contacts [by federal courts]
is clearly constitutional").
19871
GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L.
sesses sovereignty over all United States territory, and therefore, it
may constitutionally provide for nationwide service of process. 6 '
It necessarily follows that United States territory as a whole should
be the relevant geographical unit for purposes of assessing minimum
contacts by foreigners in federal question cases.' 6 1 Indeed, appli-
cation of a pure national contacts test by federal courts in federal
question cases would be the appropriate parallel to application of
the International Shoe state contacts test used by state courts in
cases involving non-resident citizens of the United States.
A pure national contacts test in federal question cases also would
serve important policy goals. As we already have seen, a pure
national contacts test would give United States courts jurisdiction
over foreigners to the maximum extent permitted under international
law, and would more accurately gauge the actual degree of hardship
that United States litigation causes foreigners. 62 Moreover, a pure
national contacts test would be more consistent with the achievement
of the federal policies underlying congressional statutes. Indeed, it
makes little sense to consider interstate notions of state sovereignty
in deciding the reach of federal personal jurisdictio6 over for-
eigners. 163
Judicial jurisdiction of state courts over state law claims presents
a somewhat different question. Application of a pure national con-
tacts test in state law cases might well be seen as exceeding territorial
'60 Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) ("Congress
[can] provide for service of process anywhere in the United States"); Robertson v.
R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) ("Congress has power, likewise, to provide
that the process of every District Court shall run into every part of the United
States"); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); Toland v.
Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838).
161 Several lower court decisions conclude that national contacts tests, authorized
by various congressional enactments, are constitutional. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp.,
651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). Similarly, Justice Stewart, dissenting in Strafford
v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 544 (1980) (emphasis added), stated that "due process
requires only certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the sovereign
that has created the court." The Court, however, did not reach this issue.
162 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
,63 Adoption of a pure national contacts standard in federal question cases could
be linked to more liberal venue transfers allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
This would help avoid seriously inconveniencing foreign defendants in those cases
where one United States federal forum would be significantly more convenient than
others. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text. Several lower courts already
have adopted such an analysis. Eng'g Equip. Co., 446 F. Supp. at 706; Holt v.
Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
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limitation on state sovereignty. Under prevailing constitutional doc-
trine applied in domestic cases, the states possess limited sovereignty
supporting assertions of judicial jurisdiction only over persons hav-
ing some connection to the forum.'6 At least a partial response is
that assertions of judicial jurisdiction by a state court over foreigners
will implicate the sovereignty of other nations, but not the sover-
eignty of other states of the Union. 65 And, as we have seen, a
national contacts test is an entirely acceptable protection for a
foreign nation's sovereignty. Moreover, putting aside theories based
on sovereignty, a national contacts test in state law cases would
serve important public interests by ensuring United States jurisdiction
over foreigners with significant United States ties, and at the same
time gauging inconvenience to foreigners and offense to foreign
sovereigns. 166
Notwithstanding the legitimacy of considering national contacts
in state law cases, considering only national contacts probably would
frustrate important policies underlying the Due Process Clause. The
forum state's interest in adjudicating particular disputes should be
a factor in Due Process analysis. 167 A pure national contacts test,
however, might permit state jurisdiction in many situations where
the forum state had little or no genuine interest in resolving the
dispute. 6 Likewise, while foreign defendants will have a compar-
atively weak interest in litigating in one United States forum rather
than another,' 69 in certain cases they may have some such prefer-
"6 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text; World- Wide Volkswagen Corp.,
444 U.S. at 293.
,65 This is the converse of the notion that "the sovereignty of each State . . .
implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States." World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 293. Where jurisdiction over a foreigner is involved,
it is the sovereignty of foreign countries, not sister states, that is implicated. See
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982) (granting state
courts jurisdiction over foreign nations on basis of national contacts test).
'6 See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
167 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292; McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. See
Weinberg, supra note 29, at 935-37.
,61 A pure national contacts test would, for example, permit a Texas court to
adjudicate claims against a Canadian company arising from a dispute that had
significant contacts with Maine, but no contacts with Texas. A rigorous application
of forum non conveniens principles would reduce the risk that such jurisdictional
claims would be made, but could not eliminate the risk. Among other things, the
forum non conveniens defense does not focus sharply on state interest, and resolution
of forum non conveniens claims is left to the trial judge's discretion. Piper Aircraft
Co., 445 U.S. at 257; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
69 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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ences. 170 A pure national contacts test would fail to take these
interests into account.
These considerations suggest that a Due Process jurisdictional
analysis in state law international cases should look to both state
and national contacts. Under this modified national contacts test,
a state court could not assert jurisdiction absent some minimal link
between the defendant and the forum state.' This link would not
require the same sort of relationship that the traditional minimum
contacts test demands, but would require some type of connection
with the forum state. Connections that would satisfy the requirement
would reflect either the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, or the defendant's expectation of suit within the state's
courts. For example, the forum state generally would have an interest
in adjudicating claims that arise from injuries suffered within the
state, from conduct taking place within the state, or from out-of-
state conduct affecting domiciliaries of the state. A defendant's
expectation of suit within a particular state would be a factual issue,
turning largely on the defendant's specific or general prelitigation
contacts with the forum. 72
170 In the hypothetical in note 168, involving a Canadian company with connections
to Maine but not to Texas, the defendant might have a preference for litigating in
Maine rather than in Texas.
Foreign defendants' preferences for particular United States forums would be
affected by choice-of-law considerations. Although substantive laws in different states
of the Union are broadly similar, in many contexts there may be significant dif-
ferences. The United States Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly held that choice-
of-law considerations are irrelevant to Due Process limitations on personal juris-
diction. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 778 ; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254.
17 In general, the personal jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity cases should
be treated similarly to that of state courts in state law cases. This conclusion would
be required by the current text of Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
supra note 23. Quite apart from Rule 4 or other legislative directives that federal
courts adhere to state jurisdictional limitations in diversity cases, the reasons requiring
only a modified national contacts test for state law claims in state courts also apply
to Due Process analysis in diversity cases. Federal courts exercising diversity juris-
diction act in effect as state courts enforcing substantive state policies. Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This suggests that federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction be treated in the same manner as state courts.
Conversely, personal jurisdiction exercised by state courts in federal question cases
should be treated similarly to that of federal courts in federal law cases. The federal
government's interest in the effectuation of federal policies, even in a state court,
is independent of a defendant's connections with a particular state of the Union.
7I Just as transfers of venue would be useful in reducing inconvenience to the
parties in federal court actions, see supra note 163, more liberal use of forum non
conveniens would be helpful in state court actions. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S.
at 235; Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 501.
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V. CONCLUSION
United States courts and commentators have devoted compara-
tively little attention to the constitutional limitations on personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants. As a result, lower courts have
taken a variety of inconsistent approaches to judicial jurisdiction
questions in international cases. These divergent approaches have
had the undesirable effect of treating similarly situated foreign lit-
igants in unpredictable, disparate ways.
The majority approach of United States courts to questions of
judicial jurisdiction in cases involving foreign defendants has been
to apply domestic Due Process standards derived from International
Shoe and its progeny. These standards do not adequately reflect
the special considerations affecting jurisdictional claims in inter-
national cases. These considerations, federal control over foreign
relations and foreign commerce, require a refinement of domestic
Due Process standards for application in international cases.
First, the level of constitutional scrutiny of jurisdictional claims
should be raised in international cases. United States courts should
use restraint in deciding jurisdictional issues in international cases,
and jurisdiction over foreign defendants should be asserted only
after a clear showing of a sufficiently close relationship to the United
States to alert the defendant to the possibility of suit there. Second,
the focus of constitutional analysis should be shifted in international
cases. In state law international cases, the Due Process Clause should
require consideration of foreign defendants' national contacts, as
well as their contacts with the forum state. In federal question cases,
a pure national contacts test, looking solely to the defendant's
contacts with the United States as a whole, should be used.
Refining the existing domestic Due Process standards for inter-
national cases would serve important public policy goals. On the
one hand, by requiring reasonably close connections with the United
States as a whole, a national contacts test would permit United
States courts to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted
under international law. By abandoning an unnecessary concern for
foreign defendants' contacts with a particular state in the Union,
this refinement would, for example, ensure United States jurisdiction
over foreign litigants with substantial, but thinly-spread United States
contacts. On the other hand, by requiring heightened constitutional
scrutiny in international cases, the refinements would reduce the
risks of exorbitant assertions of jurisdiction over foreigners. This,
in turn, would minimize the danger of giving offense to foreign
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sovereigns or provoking retaliatory commercial or legal actions.
Finally, these improvements would make Due Process analysis in
international cases more predictable and more responsive to the
United States and foreign interests at stake in these cases.
